When reverse engineering a binary, the analyst must rst understand the semantics of the binary's functions through either manual or automatic analysis. Manual semantic analysis is time-consuming, because abstractions provided by high level languages, such as type information, variable scope, or comments are lost, and past analyses cannot apply to the current analysis task. Existing automated binary analysis tools currently su er from low accuracy in determining semantic function identi cation in the presence of diverse compilation environments.
INTRODUCTION
Semantic binary analysis -the act of determining a function's use within a binary -has applications in many research and engineering areas. In so ware forensics, identical code in di erent binaries can be evidence of plagiarism or copyright violations [39] . Identical semantic code in a single binary is redundant, and can be removed by so ware engineers to limit binary bloat [52] . Determining how a new malware a ects computer systems o en starts with reverse Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. Conference'17, Washington, DC, USA © 2019 ACM. 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn engineering the semantic behavior of functions present in the binary [50] . Malware authors o en make slight changes from existing malware to create a new strain in an e ort to evade detection, and malware researchers use semantic similarity to deduce lineages in these newly discovered strains [4, 26] . More dubiously, a ackers can nd vulnerabilities in closed source so ware by performing semantic analysis on pre-and post-patched binaries [5] .
As di cult as it is to determine a function's semantic behavior from source [19, 27, 28, 31, 36] , it is even more di cult from a compiled binary [40] . To gain an understanding of what a binary does, the analyst must determine the set of changes to program state a function can conduct (e.g., what computations the functions perform, or what memory addresses are wri en to), ascribe a semantic meaning to each function, and then build a whole program understanding from how the semantic pieces t together. Unfortunately, whole-program analysis remains a challenge because manual analysis is time-consuming and automated solutions [12, 16, 25, 59, 64] are inaccurate.
e inaccuracy of existing automated semantic identi ers stems from the di culty in establishing a relationship between semantic behavior and the generated code that performs the semantic behavior.
Automated solutions [54] all measure properties of binary code (e.g., order and type of instructions [59] , memory locations accessed [16, 37] , or number of system calls made [47] ), comparing the behavior of functions based on the similarity of the implementation. ese solutions assume that code similarity approximates function semantic similarity, but machine code can vary while still preserving function semantics. We propose program state change as a be er, more stable semantic function identi er. Program state change as a function identi er relies on the fact that semantic behavior is stable across compilations, environments, and implementations. us, program state change provides an ideal ngerprint, as it is impervious to compilation environment diversity or compilation information loss. Code measurement approaches, conversely, are largely susceptible to least one of these complicating factors.
We draw an analogy between the analysis of function semantics and the biological concept of ethology (from the Greek ethos and logia, meaning the study of character). A major topic in ethology is the study of reliably predictable animal responses to the presence of known environmental stimuli. Analogously, semantically similar functions reliably make predictable changes to program state for given initial states. In this paper, we present So ware Ethology, a binary semantic analysis framework. Instead of relying on measuring code properties of a function, So ware Ethology abstracts functions into characteristic sets of inputs and corresponding program state changes. e core idea of So ware Ethology is to observe and identify the behavior or character of functions instead of the underlying code, and then use the observed behavior as a unique function identi er. at ngerprint can then be used later to identify unknown functions in a stripped binary, irrespective of the compilation environment used to generate the binary.
As a proof of concept of So ware Ethology, we implement Tinbergen 1 , a dynamic, fuzzer-inspired function identi cation tool. Tinbergen adapts mutational fuzzers to discover a subset of a function's unique set of inputs and measurable program state changes (referred to as Input/Output Vectors, or IOVecs). Tinbergen then organizes the discovered IOVecs into a searchable tree, from which unknown functions can be classi ed as a previously analyzed function, or as genuinely unique functionality, which should be the focus of manual analysis. Additionally, Tinbergen can identify possible redundant functions in binaries when two functions cannot be di erentiated, or share a common parent in the tree.
We evaluate Tinbergen on accuracy amid varying compilation environments, a task existing works nd di cult yet is crucial for automated reverse engineering. We measure accuracy by identifying functions in the coreutils-8.30 application suite, and we nd that Tinbergen achieves a high .805 average accuracy across 64 di erent compilation environments.
In short, this paper provides the following contributions:
(1) Introduction of So ware Ethology, a resilient approach to semantic binary analysis. 
CHALLENGES AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we outline challenges for semantic function identi cation, and our assumptions when designing Tinbergen and So ware Ethology.
Semantic Function Analysis
e manual process of reverse engineering a binary starts with extracting and disassembling the instructions that the binary contains. Due to code obfuscation techniques, ge ing the disassembled code can be di cult, but work on code extraction makes this feasible [32, 51] . When the code is disassembled, function identi cation, i.e., determining the location and size of functions, is performed. Recent work [2, 48] has shown high accuracy and generality, and many disassemblers [25, 49] provide this analysis out of the box.
Once the function bounds are identi ed in the code, the herculean task of semantic identi cation -determining what computation or program state change a function performs -begins. Semantic identi cation is the hardest, most time-consuming part of reverse engineering. e main culprits impeding binary semantic analysis are binary size, compilation environment diversity, and information loss during compilation. Frustratingly, these also prevent the results for manual analysis of one binary from transferring to another, i.e., each binary has to be analyzed from scratch.
As Figure 1 illustrates, even for a relatively stable API like the standard C library, binary sizes tend to grow with every subsequent version. As binaries increase in size, reverse engineering becomes more di cult, because larger sizes introduce more branches in the functions' Control-Flow Graphs (CFGs), and consequently exponentially more paths to explore for determining semantic behavior. e largest impediment, however, to reverse engineering a binary is the large code diversity due to di erent compilation environments. Here, we refer to the compilation environment as the exact compiler and linker brand and version, optimization level, compile-and link-time ags, linker scripts, underlying source, and libraries used to generate a binary.
Compilers a empt to create e cient, optimized code, and di erent compilers utilize di erent optimization sets. While compilers preserve the high level semantics expressed at the source level, the generated binary code is highly variable (see Figure 2 ). e source (Listing 1) is from the strlen implementation in the musl C library [43] . Di erent optimization levels of the same compiler (Listing 2 and Listing 3), di erent compilers at the same optimization level (Listing 2 and Listing 4), and di erent versions of the same compiler and same optimization level (Listing 2 and Listing 5) all produce di erent code and/or CFGs from the same underlying source. To worsen the situation, custom implementation of functions (as opposed to the use of system-distributed libraries) will likely produce signi cantly di erent binaries even in the same compilation environment. Optimizations, like dead code analysis and tail call insertions, also greatly a ect the generated machine code.
Compilation removes key information from the source code that hinders manual analysis. High level features provided by the programming language (e.g., control-ow, scoping, variable types, or comments) are lost. For example, one branch in the CFG of a function might interpret a C-style union as a char, and another might interpret it as a void*. Regardless, in the binary, each branch would refer to the union in the same way, e.g., a constant o set from rbp for stack local variables. Such ambiguities in binaries force analysts to ascribe di erent semantic meanings to functions depending on the path through the CFG.
Compiler and linker di erences both inadvertently conspire to prevent prior analysis from trivially transferring to new binaries. is forces the analyst to examine every function individually, even for functions that were previously analyzed. Diversity in compilation environments also presents a signi cant challenge to automated code-based semantic identi ers. Static analysis tools, like BinDiff or IDA [25] , are inaccurate when presented with highly optimized code [16] . State-of-the-art dynamic analysis tools [16, 59] perform be er, but still struggle with varying compilation environments or purposefully obfuscated code.
However, regardless of compilation environment, the program state changes a function performs must remain stable for a binary to exhibit correct behavior. Barring any bug in the compiler implementation or inconsequential actions such as dead stores, the same source code should produce the same semantic behavior in the nal application. If this was not the case, binaries would exhibit di erent, and likely incorrect, behavior in di erent builds.
Each function implicitly speci es a unique set of input states that produce a measurable set of changes in program state, determining the behavior or character of the function. Di erent input states for the same function can produce di erent changes in program state, and di erent functions may produce di erent changes in program state for a single input state. Semantic identi cation can therefore be de ned as the discovery of a characteristic set of input states and the corresponding external program state changes the function performs given the input. We call these inputs and program state changes Input/Output Vectors, or IOVecs. e challenge is to nd a su ciently distinct set of IOVecs that can uniquely identify a function. However, once found, this set can be used to identify a function in another binary regardless of compilation environment. IOVecs are thus ideal for semantic function identi cation.
Assumptions
When designing So ware Ethology, we made the following assumptions:
(1) Binary code is stripped, but neither packed nor obfuscated. Reverse engineers are only given the stripped binary from which to glean an understanding, and have no access to the underlying source, debugging information, symbol table, or any other humanidenti able information. is is the se ing we assume for So ware Ethology. We also make the assumption that all code is unpacked, and that the binary was generated from a high-level language with a notion of individual functions. e la er assumption precludes applications wri en wholly in assembly with no discernible functions, and, while packed code is another serious challenge in binary analysis [15, 32, 51] , that topic is orthogonal to the analysis that So ware Ethology performs. Finally, as it is rare in practice and most likely a bug, we assume that no code relies on unde ned behavior to correctly function. Note that functions which rely on randomness are still valid (e.g., cryptographic functions); we simply assume that function semantics do not change with the compiler.
Calling a function can cause many writes to occur inside and outside the local stack frame. However, the writes a function makes cannot only be ephemeral, e.g., operating only on local stack frame memory and not returning a value. is is because once nished, any change would be overwri en or unused by later instructions, and thus the program would have been more e cient had it not called the function at all. Functions that make only ephemeral changes are dead code, and we assume that the compiler will simply remove such code from the nal binary. Note that depending on optimization level, some program state operations, e.g., dead stores which write to addresses but are never read, can be removed from the nal binary. We do not include such operations in the function's set of program state changes, but focus on persistent and externally measurable program state changes. We argue that most user space functions conform to these standards, however, we discuss the limitations these standards impose in § 7. Given the assumption that functions make changes to input program states which are measurable post-execution, we can reframe 1 i n t my div ( i n t a , i n t b , i n t * c ) { * c = a / b ; 3 r e t u r n 0 ; } Listing 6: An IOVec Motivating Example.
SOFTWARE ETHOLOGY
semantic function identi cation. Precisely identifying a function can be seen as identifying the full set of IOVecs which a function accepts. We call that set the function's characteristic IOVec set (CIS).
Consider the toy example in Listing 6. An accepting input program state is one that has the rst argument set to any integer, the second argument set to any integer except 0, and the third argument set to any properly mapped memory address. e memory location pointed to by c can initially have any value. e corresponding output program state has the return value set to 0, and the memory location pointed to by c contains the value of a/b. An IOVec is a single concrete tuple of accepting input state and corresponding output state, and CIS my div is the full set of IOVecs my div accepts. Note that only the rst two arguments, the location pointed to by c, and the return value, are relevant, and neither the full address space nor every register value.
Every function has a CIS, and we hypothesize that most functions have a unique (non-empty) CIS. A set of functions that share a CIS is called an equivalence class. An example of an equivalence class is the set of various architecture speci c implementations of memmove in glibc, e.g., memmove sse2 or memmove avx512. Equivalence classes in binaries indicate duplicated functionality, and can guide engineers in reducing code bloat. For the sake of brevity, unless otherwise noted, when we refer to a function, we are actually referring to an equivalence class of functions with equal functionality.
In the general case, a function's CIS is unbounded. So for practical reasons, we a empt to nd a subset of a function's CIS, which we call the distinguishing characteristic IOVec set, or DCIS. A DCIS for function f , DCIS f , consists entirely of IOVecs which f accepts, and only f accepts every member of DCIS f . Another function, , might accept a member of DCIS f , but there is at least one IOVec I ∈ DCIS f which does not accept. So ware Ethology is used to identify a function foo in a binary by providing foo with IOVecs I j ∈ DCIS f . If foo accepts all I j s, then we say that foo ≡ f .
So ware Ethology needs an oracle to provide IOVecs in order to semantically identify functions, but there is no de nitive source of IOVecs. Tinbergen was designed to be one such oracle, but other oracles can be devised. For example, IOVecs can be derived from unit tests or inferred from a speci cation. IOVecs also do not need to capture large portions of the address space in order for So ware Ethology to be useful. Instead, IOVecs only need to contain the data that functions access, and oracles providing IOVecs can make any a empt at minimizing the data in an IOVec.
e number of IOVecs So ware Ethology needs in order to be as precise as possible is highly dependent on the diversity and number of functions analyzed. e minimal theoretical number of needed IOVecs is equal to the number of functions being analyzed, because So ware Ethology needs at least one accepting IOVec to identify and distinguish a function. However, it is likely more IOVecs are needed to precisely distinguish functions.
Currently, we utilize language semantics present in C, such as the existence of pointers and a well-de ned calling convention. is is purely an implementation aspect, and di erent language semantics would have to be accounted for to use So ware Ethology. For example, the structure of IOVecs and the oracle providing IOVecs will change when analyzing Java applications, because there is no concept of a pointer in Java. Nevertheless, the idea that program state change is a semantic identi er can be applied universally.
Matching Program States
Key to the design of So ware Ethology is the de nition of matching program states. Here, we present our de nition of matching program states that Tinbergen uses to identify C functions.
Recall that our notion of input program state includes the arguments given to functions. Semantically similar functions should modify data contained at input pointers in similar ways (if at all), so we compare memory regions for arguments that are pointers. e target of pointers can be any arbitrary data structure, containing a mix of pointer and non-pointer data at various locations within the structure. Non-pointer values in memory regions should be bytewise the same, and any pointers to sub-objects should be located at the same o set from the base pointer. Of course, the pointer values are not expected to be the same, however, any target of pointers need to match according to these criteria as well. If there is a single mismatch in memory objects between two program states, then the states do not match.
Return values are also pertinent, but can be implementation dependent. We recognize two types of return values: pointers and non-pointers. Due to the lack of any type information in binaries, precisely determining if a return value is a pointer is challenging. We conservatively test if the return value maps to a readable region in memory, and if it does, we designate the return value as a pointer. If a return value is not readable in memory, then we consider it a non-pointer, and can represent a few classes of functions. Nonpointer return values can be the result of some direct computation on the input, such as sin, abs, or toupper. Non-pointer return values can also be the result of functions that assume a contract. Contract assuming functions return values that need to follow a general form detailed in a speci cation, but the developer is free to use any value which conforms to the speci cation. For example, strcmp can return any value < 0, = 0, or > 0 depending upon the memory state of the input pointers. Contract assuming functions also include functions that use return values as an indication of failure, such as open, which returns −1 or a valid le descriptor.
In order for two program states to match, the values contained in return registers must match in the following ways. Return values must both be pointers or non-pointers. As we do not know the size of the underlying memory region, we do not check the underlying memory values if the return values are pointers; we simply say the return values match. If the return values are non-pointers, they must be equal, or both must be positive or negative. If all input pointers (including pointers to all sub-objects) match, and the return values match, then the two program states match. As we do not perform any static analysis, void functions will also go through return value analysis, leading to a source of potential inaccuracy.
TINBERGEN DESIGN
As stated before, So ware Ethology needs an oracle to provide IOVecs for semantic function identi cation. Ideally, a formal speci cation of a function's semantics would allow us to generate a minimal DCIS. However, such a speci cation is o en not available, and we are forced to infer valid IOVecs. To that end, Tinbergen uses dynamic instrumentation to precisely control and monitor execution, and adapts techniques from state-of-the-art fuzzers to generate IOVecs, leveraging code coverage as an optimization and approximation of IOVec state coverage. Tinbergen can be used by analysts to identify previously analysed C functions in unknown binaries, allowing the analysts to focus on novel functionality. Additionally, Tinbergen can be used to nd duplicate code when two functions cannot be distinguished when analysis is complete.
With the release of American Fuzzy Lop [62] in 2015, fuzzing became a practical means of testing large so ware bases, and has become an invaluable part of many large pro le projects [23] . Fuzz testers, or fuzzers, come in many avors, but mutational coverage-guided greybox fuzzers -the most widely used class of fuzzers today -are the most relevant to Tinbergen. Mutational fuzzers [3, 6, 8, 10, 21, 22, 24, 30, 38, 46, 53, 55, 60, 62] take an initial seed input, randomly permute the input, and provide the target application with the permuted input in an a empt to nd new paths in the application. is process is then repeated rapidly in an e ort to cover as many code paths as possible. Coverage-guided fuzzing is an e cient technique to explore as many code paths as possible without a formal speci cation. Di erent execution paths in functions tend to lead to di erent program state changes, which we can then measure and generate identifying IOVecs.
Due to its simplicity, fuzzing approaches quickly achieved widespread adoption. Mutational fuzzers do not require any specication of the target application; a small input le containing a few characters is o en enough to generate high code path coverage. Since we have no information about an unknown function's semantic behavior, the ideas behind feedback-guided mutational fuzzing are useful in discovering IOVecs. We adopt techniques from fuzzing to generate IOVecs for use in semantic function identi cation, allowing us to classify functions without expert knowledge of their inner workings. By rapidly feeding a function random inputs, and measuring the program state change post-execution, we can build a corpus of function identi cation data without any a priori knowledge.
Tinbergen performs its analysis in two distinct phases: a onetime learning phase that identi es distinguishing behavior, and an identi cation phase for unknown binaries. In the learning phase, Tinbergen uses mutational fuzzer techniques to generate a DCIS for every function in a binary. Tinbergen then organizes the generated IOVecs into a binary decision tree, with each interior node representing an IOVec and a leaf representing a function. In the second phase, semantic function identi cation in unknown binaries consists of traversing the decision tree. Starting at the root, the unknown function is presented with the speci c IOVec, and the path through the decision tree is determined by whether the function accepts the IOVec at each node. Analysis ends when a leaf is encountered, and a label is assigned to the unknown function.
e following sections describe each phase in detail. Figure 3 shows the overall design of the rst phase of Tinbergen's binary analysis. Tinbergen supports analyzing any executable code, including shared libraries. Static libraries need to be included in either a shared library or executable. Note that Tinbergen does not require the source or any debug information. However, it does need the starting location of each function in an executable, or the exported symbol names in a shared library. Once provided with this information [2, 48] , Tinbergen then enters its exploration phase. Tinbergen employs fuzzing as a way to discover valid IOVecs. We chose fuzzing as our exploration strategy because fuzzing is optimized to maximize code coverage, leading to maximal program state change coverage, which we use for identi cation. Of course, we are not restricted to using fuzzing to provide an IOVec oracle, and Tinbergen can be extended to incorporate any IOVec generator.
Learning Phase
For each Function Under Test (FUT), Tinbergen fuzzes the input arguments (see § 5), and then begins executing the FUT with this randomized program state. If that program state is accepted (see § 3) then the IOVec consisting of the initial input state and the state immediately upon return is added to the FUT's DCIS. A er an IOVec has been successfully generated, the input arguments are again fuzzed, and the FUT is executed again with the new input program state. is process continues for a user speci ed amount of time. e exact amount of time the fuzzing process takes is not very critical. If the initial fuzzing stage does not provide enough distinguishing IOVecs, then it can be repeated for the functions with low quality IOVecs that do not trigger di erentiable program state change. While the fuzzing process does not result in a provably minimal FUT DCIS, the generated DCIS is still compact due to our use of coverage-guided fuzzing, which is optimized to achieve high code coverage, and accordingly, high IOVec state coverage.
As mentioned earlier, we only need to save the data we expect to change. Every saved input state contains the input arguments to the FUT, and if an input argument is a pointer, the contents of the allocated memory regions. See § 5.1 for discussion on how an input argument is upgraded to a pointer. e saved output program state consists of the contents of allocated memory regions, a boolean indicating whether the return value is a pointer (see § 3.1), and the concrete value if the return value is not a pointer. We do not a empt to capture the entire address space in an e ort to minimize the size of the captured IOVecs.
Before every instruction a FUT executes, Tinbergen records the immediate values of the general purpose registers, the PC register, and the stack and base pointer registers. ese are used for taint analysis if a segmentation fault occurs (see § 5.1), and are discarded a er every FUT execution iteration.
Once all initial DCISes are generated, Tinbergen enters its coalescing stage. A hash of the non-pointer register values and nonpointer memory values in allocated regions is generated for every IOVec, and a le (the IOVec Map in Figure 3 ) mapping hashes to IOVecs is saved for the identi cation stage. Because at this point in the analysis no DCIS f contains the full ground truth, a "cross pollination process" must occur.
is is to ensure that when the decision tree is generated later, a proper ordering can be achieved, and a decision at each interior node does not lead to an incorrect conclusion. erefore, each function for which a DCIS has been created is given every IOVec in the IOVec Map, and one of four results can occur for each IOVec test:
(1) e function receives a fatal signal (e.g., SEGSIGV), due to an improper input program state. (2) e function does not nish executing before a user-speci ed time expires. (3) e function returns, but the nal program state does not match the expected output program state. (4) e function returns, and the nal program matches the expected output program state.
If and only if the last event occurs, then the IOVec is added to DCIS f . As future work, we want to incorporate rejected IOVecs into the identi cation process as rejected IOVecs classify the excluded semantics of this function. All DCISes are then given to a decision tree generator.
e resulting decision tree consists of singular IOVec hashes as the interior nodes, and functions at the leaves.
is decision tree is also saved for the identi cation phase. Every path in the decision tree enumerates the minimal DCIS f needed to distinguish f from any other function.
If the same path in the decision tree maps to more than one function, then a potential equivalence class exists in the binary.
e functions in the leaf are those for which the generated DCIS is insu cient to fully distinguish one function from another. is can be because of poor functionality coverage during the fuzzing stage, or because the members are truly an equivalence class. Figure 4 illustrates the design of the identi cation phase of Tinbergen. e analyst provides Tinbergen with an unknown binary, and functions in the unknown binary are given a label based on which IOVecs are accepted or rejected. e decision tree only needs to be created once during the learning phase, and then can be used to identify functions in any number of binaries, without any prior knowledge of the compilation environment. is is because Tinbergen, and So ware Ethology in general, does not rely on code measurements, but instead relies on program state measurements for semantic identi cation.
Identi cation Phase
Recall that the interior nodes of the decision tree consists of IOVec hashes. Starting from the root of the decision tree, Tinbergen looks up the IOVec in the map using the hash, and passes the IOVec to the unknown function. If the IOVec is accepted (see § 3), the true branch (right path) in the decision tree is taken; otherwise, the false branch (le path) is taken. e unknown function is then tested against another IOVec depending on the path taken. When the path arrives at a leaf, the unknown function is tested against one more IOVec from the leaf function's DCIS for con rmation.
Again, if the IOVec is accepted, then the function is given the label of the function at the leaf. If the unknown function gets to a leaf and remains uncon rmed, then the function is labeled as unknown.
TINBERGEN IMPLEMENTATION
Here we will discuss details of our implementation of Tinbergen, and how input arguments are upgraded to pointers during the learning phase (see § 4.1). Currently, our implementation focuses on 64-bit Linux executables and shared libraries derived from C source code. Our implementation uses the Intel Pin 3.7 [11] binary translator, with 2.493 lines of C++ code, and 1.600 lines of Python. Pin readily supports Windows and 32-bit systems, adding support for these systems would require minor engineering e orts.
Fuzzing Strategy. Previous work on fuzzing has lead to the discovery of best practices for generating inputs that are most likely to maximize code coverage. Determining a function's CIS can be seen as a proxy for maximal code coverage. We, therefore, adopt the same best practices when fuzzing a function's input. Instead of purely random values, recent work [60] shows that preferring a speci c group of input values (the interesting values in Listing 7), such as 0, −1, and INT MAX, produce higher coverage. As a result, Tinbergen prefers se ing register values or allocated areas with those values. However, as Listing 7 shows, we also employ other standard practice operations, such as random bit ips or arithmetic operations on random locations.
In order to discover a function's DCIS, Tinbergen fuzzes the input arguments of a function, and independently executes the function with that fuzzed program state. We currently have not implemented special support to detect arguments passed on the stack (e.g., for variadic functions or arguments passed by value). Tinbergen fuzzes the six argument registers, and memory regions for arguments which are pointers, which implicitly assumes that every function has the same arity. is is su cient as most functions have an arity less than six, and any "used" argument register can be safely overwri en by the lower arity function.
Pointer Derivation
A major challenge to fuzzing functions (although not a general problem with So ware Ethology) is the detection of pointers as input arguments. Because type information is missing in binaries, determining if an input argument is a pointer is an ongoing research topic [41, 44] . Without recovering which arguments are pointers, determining a DCIS for a function is generally impossible, and only incomplete behavior will be captured.
A naïve solution would be to simply replace an invalid address with a valid address before an illegal dereference occurs. While such a solution has been successfully used to solve other problems in binary analysis [29, 45] , it would not work in So ware Ethology, because the underlying problem -semantically, an input is supposed to be a pointer when it is not -remains unsolved. Soware Ethology relies on measuring program state changes that arise from executing a function with a speci c input program state. By replacing an illegal address in situ, the resulting output program state does not necessarily arise from actions the functions performs given the initial state. Figure 6 : Backwards Taint Propagation. t and u can be a register or memory address. T(x) taints x and R(x) removes taint from x.
• denotes any logic or arithmetic operator.
Consider the code in Figure 5 , which is adapted from the strlen assembly in Figure 2 . e rst pointer argument to strlen (passed in using register rdi) is stored on the stack (line 1). Later, that address is wri en to register rax (line 4), and then is dereferenced and compared with the null terminator (line 6). Our fuzzing strategy is unlikely to supply a valid address as input, and line 6 will cause a SEGSIGV signal to be issued. e naïve approach would replace the invalid address in rax with a valid address. If the function later returns with no other issue, then Tinbergen would register strlen as accepting the input program state with rdi set to a random (non-pointer) value. is is incorrect, and during the identi cation phase, an implementation of strlen in an unknown binary would not accept the input program state. at strlen implementation would then be marked as an unknown function, or worse, as a di erent, incorrect function. e solution we propose is a backwards taint analysis inspired by Wang et al. [59] . As mentioned in § 4.1, while generating IOVecs in Phase I, Tinbergen records immediate register values before every instruction executes, and, if a segmentation fault occurs, we get the faulting register through a Pin API function 2 . e resulting register is the taint source, and Tinbergen then uses the saved register values to propagate the taint back to a root sink. e taint propagation policy is listed in Figure 6 . Starting from the last executed instruction, each instruction is parsed in reverse order until all instructions are iterated through. e root sink is the last tainted register a er all instructions are processed. We currently only support upgrading function arguments, and not global variables.
When a register sink is discovered, Tinbergen allocates a xedsize memory region, and begins executing the FUT from its beginning with the sink register set to the address of the allocated region. If another segmentation fault occurs due to an argument which is already a pointer, then the underlying object is expected to contain another pointer. In this case, another xed-size memory region is allocated, and its address is wri en to the parent memory region at the appropriate location based on the faulting address.
is process continues until the FUT successfully completes, at which point Tinbergen records the correctly initialized input program state, and the corresponding output program state, along with the coarse-grained object structure derived from the backwards taint analysis. Tinbergen only tracks which memory areas are supposed to be pointers, and no other semantic meaning is given to memory regions containing non-pointer data. Further fuzzing iterations maintain the memory object structure, and only the non-pointer memory areas are fuzzed. 2 In Pin 3.7, we used INS OperandMemoryBaseReg
EVALUATION
We performed our evaluation using an Intel Core i7-4790 CPU, with 16 GB of RAM, and running Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS. In our evaluation, we address the following research questions:
(1) How accurate is So ware Ethology in identifying functions in binaries? (2) Is So ware Ethology truly resilient against compilation environment changes? (3) Can So ware Ethology correctly semantically identify functions missing in previous analyses?
Our results do in fact show that So ware Ethology is a feasible and accurate semantic function identi er. Additionally, our results show that So ware Ethology is largely una ected by compilation environment changes, and that So ware Ethology can quickly identify previously analyzed functions in novel binaries.
Accuracy Amid Environment Changes
In order to evaluate Tinbergen's accuracy, we identify functions in the coreutils-8.30 application suite. We compiled the set of applications using gcc 7.3.0 [56] and clang 6.0.0 [34] , at O0-O3 optimization levels, resulting in a set of 844 binaries for which we semantically identify functions. Additionally, each executable was statically linked to provide the broadest possible unknown function set. In order to establish ground truth, we compiled all binaries with debug symbols enabled (-g). However, Tinbergen does not use them for any of its analyses, and they were only used for determining accuracy a er all analyses had completed.
e accuracy numbers we report are the ratio of correctly given labels to all assigned labels, or (T P +T N )/(T P +F P +T N +F N ), with T P as True Positive, F P as False Positive, T N as True Negative, and F N as False Negative. A true positive is when the FUT is assigned an equivalence class in which the function is classi ed, and a true negative is the assignment of unknown to a function that is not present in the decision tree. e mislabeling of a function, either by assigning the incorrect equivalence class or labeling a known function as unknown, incurs a false positive and false negative penalty. e false positive comes from the incorrect label given to the function, and the false negative comes from our claim that the function does not belong to its correct equivalence class.
To conduct our evaluation, we built a decision tree (see § 4.1) using a random binary from the evaluation suite generated by each compiler and each optimization level (for a total of 8 decision trees). We chose random binaries to demonstrate the fact that Tinbergen is consistently accurate, regardless of how a decision tree was generated; Tinbergen should not rely upon choosing an "optimal" binary to maximize accuracy. For every decision tree, we used that tree to identify functions in all 844 available binaries in the evaluation suite. In order to determine the correctness of a label, we performed a simple string comparison between the name of the Function Under Test and the functions in the assigned equivalence class. If any matched, we record a true positive, otherwise we record a mislabel. Likewise, if a function is labeled as unknown, and its name appears in any equivalence class, a mislabel is assigned. Otherwise, a true negative is recorded. As the number of classi ed functions is large and consistent for each binary used (see Figure 9 ), we believe that our experimental setup is a fair evaluation, as well as indicative as to how we expect Tinbergen to be used in practice. Figure 7 shows the average accuracy achieved with each decision tree. Each row reports the accuracy of the speci c decision tree has when used to identify functions in binaries generated with a speci c compilation environment (presented as the columns).
e diagonal numbers (in bold) are, therefore, the accuracy rates when the decision tree and evaluation suite match in both compiler and optimization level. ey are unsurprisingly among the most accurate Tinbergen achieved, and represent the data most reported by other related works. Overall, we achieve a high .805 accuracy rate, but the diagonal numbers -the numbers which allows for the best apples-to-apples comparison with related works -is .835. We believe that these results show that So ware Ethology is accurate as a semantic function identi er, as well as largely resilient to compilation environments (Research estions 1 and 2). Unfortunately, the two closest systems to Tinbergen, BLEX [16] and IMF-SIM [59] are closed source, and we could neither obtain the source code nor the detailed results from the authors. However, our results are similar, if not be er, than the results reported by the authors in the respective papers. e BLEX authors report an accuracy of .50-.64 across three compilers (they added Intel's icc compiler) and four optimization levels, and the IMF-SIM authors report an accuracy of .57-.66 across three compilers and three optimization levels. Both systems a empt to build a classi cation vector from code measurements, and their lowest inaccuracies come from labeling functions in binaries from compilation environments di erent from their source models. Tinbergen, in contrast, is accurate regardless of compilation environment, as evidenced by the o -diagonal numbers in Figure 7 . Our results show an average 30%-61% increase in accuracy in di ering compilation environments over these competing works. Note that we will release our Tinbergen prototype along with our full results as open-source with the published paper.
We identify two major sources of inaccuracy: false mislabel designations, and state dependence. We give concrete examples of both in Figure 11 , which list ve of the most commonly mislabeled functions in our tests. False mislabel designations are the assignment of a mislabel to a function, when the label is in fact correct -a key feature of So ware Ethology that arti cially lowers our accuracy measurements. State dependence mislabels are the result of missing some needed state for proper classi cation.
False Mislabels. Functions present in less optimized binaries might be missing from more highly optimized binaries. e compiler, for instance, might opt to replace a wrapper function with the underlying function. is behavior, while reasonable for performance, makes determining our true accuracy di cult, as a precise ground truth requires manual source analysis. For example, xcharalloc (if missing from the decision tree) is always equated with the function xmalloc, which is correct because they di er only by return pointer type. However, that determination can only be made by examining the source. As our evaluation metric relies upon a full string match between the FUT name and the assigned equivalence class, a (false) mislabel is given. As another example, the function c isalpha (and its family) is given the false mislabel iswalpha (or related), despite their equivalence in a default system environment. We ensured that the hardware-speci c memory comparison and copying functions (e.g., memcpy and strcmp) are properly equated, as they are interchangeable. Generally, though, without expert knowledge or extensive source analysis, true equivalences cannot be known, and we opted to be as conservative as possible when determining correctness by performing no further analysis. Note that the inaccuracy introduced through false mislabels is due to our conservative evaluation metric and lack of precise ground truth, and not due to an inherent aw in Tinbergen or Soware Ethology. In fact, false mislabels give evidence that we satisfy Research estion 3, but due to the inherent imprecision of our evaluation metric, the presented results are an under-approximation Figure 9 : Total number of classi ed functions (N ), and average number of functions per equivalence class (N ), per generated decision tree in the coreutils-8. 30 evaluation. e median equivalence class size is 1.00 for all 8 decision trees.
of the accuracy. Ideally, we would require a fully precise ground truth but this would require extensive manual labeling.
State Dependence. For simplicity, we designed Tinbergen to assume nothing when generating IOVecs, and it always executes functions in isolation. However, there are functions (e.g. close and munmap) that depend on the results of previous functions in order for the input arguments to be semantically correct. close requires that the input integer be a valid open le descriptor (as obtained from open), and any input that is not a valid le descriptor is semantically incorrect. Similarly, munmap requires a valid pointer obtained via a previous call to mmap. Because Tinbergen does not perform any initial setup to obtain semantically correct input values, these functions are likely to be misclassi ed. is is not a fundamental aw in So ware Ethology, but instead is a result of Tinbergen's focus on user-space functions. We expect that our accuracy would improve signi cantly if we added some common environmental activities (such as opening le descriptors or memory mapping address spaces) to our IOVec design. We have it as future work to incorporate application speci c environmental setup to Tinbergen. Figure 9 shows the total number of classi ed functions (N ), and the average number of functions per equivalence class (N ). Ideally, N should be close to one, as most functions provide unique and singular functionality, and thus should be assigned as the sole member of an unique equivalence class. However, with the existence of wrapper functions and hardware-speci c implementations of the same function, it is likely N will be higher. It nevertheless should be low, because one could trivially get high accuracy by grouping all functions into the same equivalence class. As Figure 9 shows, we achieve a low N across our decision trees, which gives an indication that our fuzzing strategy is a generally sound technique for generating su ciently distinctive IOVecs. We also achieve a high N across all decision trees, demonstrating the universality of Tinbergen, since we are able to classify a large number of diverse functions. Additionally, the equivalence class size distribution shown in Figure 8 (with a more granular breakdown provided in Figure 12 in the appendix) shows that we are creating hundreds of equivalence classes with one or two functions per equivalence class. We, therefore, claim that our accuracy comes from Tinbergen's ability to distinguish function semantics, and is not simply grouping all functions into a few equivalence classes.
Equivalence Class Distributions
For each decision tree, there are some equivalence classes containing a large (more than 10) number of functions. ese are cases where our fuzzing strategy was unable to trigger deep functionality, yet the classi ed functions share a common failure mode (e.g. return −1 for invalid input). Improvements in related fuzzing work will directly translate to an improvement of coverage and a reduction of the size of these equivalence classes. Additionally, approximately 15% of the functions in the large equivalence classes are functions that are used to provide runtime dispatch of di erent C library functions 3 . ese functions take in no argument, perform some analysis on the hardware currently present, and then return the pointer of the speci c implementation to use. As these functions violate our assumption that functions change program state when executed, So ware Ethology will struggle to identify such functions. However, these functions are designed to never be called directly, and are purely an artifact of using glibc.
Training and Labeling Time
On average, Tinbergen takes 16 CPU hours to generate a decision tree, which includes generating IOVecs and the cross pollination phase described in § 4.1. As stated before, however, this analysis only needs to be done once. Once the decision tree is generated, semantic analysis is very quick, taking, on average, only 14 CPU minutes to classify a binary in the evaluation set. Note that all operations in both of Tinbergen's phases represent completely independent work loads, and as such are embarrassingly parallel.
erefore, execution time varies with the available hardware. BLEX reports 1, 368 CPU hours for training, and 30 CPU minutes to classify a binary in coreutils. IMF-SIM takes 1, 027 CPU hours for training, and 31 CPU minutes to classify a coreutils binary. Although there are hardware di erences between the related works and our experimental setup, we are con dent that Tinbergen's training is at least 1.5 orders of magnitude faster, and 50% faster at classifying binaries. We believe that we are faster at semantic queries because we organize past analysis in a tree-like structure; BLEX and IMF-SIM must compare the feature vector they record with every past feature vector, creating an O(lo (n)) vs. O(n) search performance disparity.
Imprecision and IOVec Case Studies
Large Equivalence Classes. To provide a concrete example of an equivalence class, as well as illustrate the issues with evaluation, we want to highlight a speci c large equivalence class generated for the LLVM O2 decision tree. e functions comprising this equivalence class are listed in Figure 10 , and include several hardware speci c implementations of memcmp, memchr, and strncmp, as well as several variants of functions which write characters to a le descriptor (the IO* functions).
In our evaluation, we would record a true positive if, for example, memchr sse2 from a binary was assigned this equivalence class, because that function name is present in the equivalence class. However, we would record a false positive and false negative if my memchr, a di erent, semantically equivalent implementation of the same function, was assigned this equivalence class.
is is because the function name is not present in the list of functions of the equivalence class. Obviously, this function belongs to this equivalence class, but we conservatively say we have mislabeled in IO default xsputn IO do write IO file xsputn IO wdefault xsputn memchr sse2 memrchr avx2 memcmp avx2 movbe memcmp sse2 memcmp sse4 1 memcmp ssse3 strncmp sse2 strncmp ssse3 Figure 10 : An equivalence class in the LLVM O2 decision tree.
order to minimize possible bias that might in uence our reported accuracy. For this reason, we claim that our reported accuracy is the lower bound that Tinbergen can achieve, and that our true accuracy is signi cantly higher. e equivalence class also highlights the e ectiveness and limitations of our fuzzing strategy and program state comparison policy.
e functions in Figure 10 all share similar signatures, in that they have a pointer as the rst argument, and the second argument is either a integer or a pointer (which is also a valid integer). However, the functions in the equivalence class are not the same, and our fuzzing round was not good enough to distinguish clear di erences in functionality. Any improvement in Tinbergen's fuzzing engine (e.g., supplying be er seeds or using more sophisticated guided fuzzing) would likely be enough to be er di erentiate the classes of functions. For example, the reason why the IO functions are grouped in this equivalence class is because the input FILE* object is not valid, and they are exiting early by returning −1.
is resulting program state is exactly the expected state from executing memcmp with di erent memory regions. By adding function coverage as a metric in our IOVecs, we could recognize that much of the functionality is not being exercised, and we could pursue other IOVec generating strategies.
Another possibility is for the analyst to provide IOVecs that distinguish the functions in the equivalence class. Generally, this can be di cult to do, but in cases like this, such a task is feasible even for non-experts. e reason memchr functions (which returns a pointer) are grouped with memcmp functions (which do not return a pointer), is because our fuzzer never generated a memory region containing the value speci ed in the second argument to memchr.
us memchr always returns 0 (which Tinbergen recognizes as a non-pointer) for every accepted input program state. Creating just one IOVec which has a memory region containing the value of the second argument is trivial, but would be enough to distinguish memchr from the other functions in this equivalence class. It is similarly trivial to create IOVecs that distinguish between memcmp and strncmp.
e IO-related functions highlight the impact of process state dependence. All of these functions take a FILE* as the rst argument, which requires opening a le descriptor beforehand. Tinbergen does not open any le descriptor before fuzzing, and thus the rst argument will never be semantically correct. Luckily, it is simply an engineering e ort to incorporate se ing up an appropriate process state before fuzzing, and we also believe that improvement would signi cantly increase accuracy.
IOVec
Extensions. An interesting extension to the information collected in an IOVec is which system calls are invoked while a FUT is executing. System calls are interesting because, as mentioned in § 3, we currently do not capture kernel state in an IOVec; however, system calls serve as a proxy for this state. Additionally, because system calls provide services that cannot be provided by user-space code and cannot be optimized out, semantically equivalent functions must invoke the same set of system calls. erefore, by adding system call knowledge into IOVecs, we expect N to decrease, with N remaining unchanged. We would also expect our accuracy to increase, because when con rming a function at the leaf, the probability of the FUT matching the system calls of the equivalence class at the leaf is generally lower.
To test this hypothesis, we added support for tracking which system calls are made during execution, but we did not track the order or number of system calls. Order and number are not tracked, because they do not necessarily translate to semantic equivalence (e.g., calling read(fd, 1) 4 times could be the same as calling read(fd, 4) once). We then extended our de nition of matching program states (see § 3.1) to include checking that the exact same system calls are made (and no more or fewer), and generated a new gcc O2 decision tree using the same binary in the original evaluation.
e total amount of developer e ort to add system call support was 73 LoCs. As expected, N remained the same, N was decreased by 13%, and accuracy increased by 3.1%. e decrease in N is signi cant, and the gains come from being able to di erentiate more functions in the largest of equivalence classes. However, the increase in accuracy is within a standard deviation of the original evaluation, and we thus cannot exclude the possibility of measurement noise.
DISCUSSION
Here we provide discussion on unknown functions and the limitations of So ware Ethology, as well as some possible future work.
Limitations. We have identi ed a few sets of functions that Soware Ethology is unlikely to classify or identify correctly. ese functions are highly dependent upon the system environment while generating IOVecs, as well as during the identi cation phase. Functions like getcwd or getpid, which return the current working directory and the process ID of the analysis respectively, depend on the lesystem, current user, and kernel state. As these factors di er between runs or are non-deterministic, our fundamental assumption -semantically similar functions change their program state in similar ways given a speci c input program state -breaks down. To address this limitation, Tinbergen could model the system state in addition to the process state.
Another set of functions So ware Ethology struggles with depend on an initial seed being set beforehand. Examples of these functions include rand and time. As we execute functions without any knowledge about their behavior, we cannot provide the seed beforehand as it is di cult to distinguish a seed value from other global variables. Even if we are able to determine a location of the seed, knowledge of proper API usage (e.g., calling srand before rand) is needed to correctly use these functions. Discerning correct API usage is an active research area [1] , and improvements in this area will directly translate to improvements in Tinbergen.
Unknown Functions. If a function is encountered that accepts no known DCIS, So ware Ethology will mark this function as unknown. When a function is marked as unknown, it can mean one of two things depending on the number of accepted IOVecs. If the unknown function never accepts an IOVec, then it implements wholly unknown functionality, and should be a main focus for analysts. Otherwise, if the function accepts some IOVecs, then it shares some functionality with the functions whose DCIS includes the accepted IOVecs.
e utility analysts might gain from this information varies with the number of IOVecs accepted. Many IOVecs rejected with a few IOVec acceptances is likely a common failure mode present in many functions, e.g., returning −1 on invalid input. If many IOVecs in a DCIS are accepted, then the unknown function is likely similar to the corresponding function, indicating, e.g., a di erent version.
Future Work. Tinbergen generates a function's DCIS through the use of techniques employed by mutational fuzzers [6, 22, 24, 35, 62] . Another key component employed by mutational fuzzers (but currently unused by Tinbergen) is the use of code coverage to guide fuzzing. By incorporating code coverage, it is possible to minimize the DCIS that provides 100% edge or code coverage of a function, designated as DCIS Ω . Later, if that function is identi ed in a new binary, then any deviation in code coverage when given DCIS Ω would indicate the presence or lack of functionality in the FUT. is could be helpful in exploit generation, or code version identi cation [5] . Recent work in binary instrumentation [9, 58] make dynamically recording code coverage feasible.
ere are several other avenues of future work to extend Soware Ethology. e natural next step is to add support for arguments passed on the stack and global variables. Stack-based arguments can be supported by, for example, writing a data to an valid memory location, and adjusting the stack and base pointers appropriately pre-execution. More care is needed for handling global variables, but it might su ce to simply record the bss and data segments before and a er execution.
We would also like to pursue support for C++ binaries, specically determining what classes are present in a binary. Currently, the this pointer -an ever-present part of the program state when class methods are executed -presents a unique challenge, as the underlying memory object is expected to have a vtable and members in particular locations. Additionally, objects are always expected to have their constructor called before any method, and can have other objects as class members.
A challenging aspect of reverse engineering is the detection of cryptographic functions in a binary. ey are di cult to identify, because they are o en implemented using architecture-speci c assembly for optimization purposes, make extensive use of randomness, and rely heavily on correct state and input. ese are situations for which So ware Ethology is particularly well-suited, and it would be worthwhile to investigate how far we can advance automated analysis on these most di cult class of functions. IOVecs, as an extension of captured state, could record the random values returned by RNGs. In the coalescing and identi cation phases, calls to RNGs could be intercepted, and the recorded random value could be returned instead of a "true" random value.
RELATED WORK
Similarity analysis is an active area of research [7, 13, 17, 20, 33, 42] . Jiang et al . [28] rst proposed using randomized testing in function similarity analysis, drawing inspiration from polynomial identity testing. eir system requires source code to identify syntactically di erent yet functionally similar code fragments, and is able to scale to large code bases such as the Linux kernel.
BLEX [16] , the closest research to our proposal, extracts features of binary functions by guaranteeing that every instruction is executed. Similarity is determined by computing an normalized weighted sum of the Jaccard indices between two function's feature vectors.
ey also implemented a search engine with their system similar to Tinbergen. Wang, et al. [59] perform code similarity analysis using a system called IMF-SIM. IMF-SIM uses an in-memory fuzzer to measure the same metrics as BLEX, instead of forcing execution to start at unexecuted instructions. IMF-SIM computes a longest common subsequence of recorded features, and makes a similarity decision based on a consensus of randomly generated trees of feature vectors. As stated in our evaluation, these works still struggle with di ering compilation environments, while Tinbergen has consistently high accuracy irrespective of compilation environment. Both works focus on measuring code properties, which change with di erent compilation environments. So ware Ethology, in contrast, uses IOVecs, which are independent of code.
Su et al. [57] use dynamic analysis to compute a dependency graph between instructions. Code similarity is determined by computing an isomorphism between subgraphs.
eir system, Dy-CLINK, targets Java applications with no support for native applications or libraries, and thus, we cannot compare Tinbergen against DyCLINK. DyCLINK su ers from the same limitations as BinDiff, namely that computing graph isomorphisms is NP-Complete. While heuristics can provide respite from state explosion in some cases, a general polynomial time algorithm remains elusive or impossible.
Due to the diverse toolchains and architectures used and its closed-source nature, binary analysis is particularly well suited to rmware. David et al. [14] , created a static analysis tool to nd CVEs in rmwares, and discovered hundreds of vulnerabilities. Feng et al. [18] , took inspiration from picture and video search to create a system that nds bugs in Internet of ings devices by converting CFGs into numerical vectors to analyze. Recently, neural networks have been used in binary analysis. In a paper published on arXiv, Zuo et al. [63] , trained a neural network to determine cross-architecture semantics of basic blocks. Liu et al. [37] , employs a deep neural network to extract features from functions and the binary call graph to compute. ese features are then used to create a distance metric for determining binary similarity. Xu et al. [61] use a neural network to compute the embedding of a function's CFG to accelerate similarity computation.
ese approaches show promise in improving computer security by utilizing research from other elds in computer science.
CONCLUSION
We introduce So ware Ethology, a semantic function identi cation framework that is compilation environment agnostic. Instead of measuring code properties, So ware Ethology abstracts functions into sets of input and output program states, information guaranteed to be stable across compilation environments. Our proof-of-concept, Tinbergen, has a high accuracy when identifying functions in binaries generated from various con gurations, while being easy to use in practice. Tinbergen is .805 accurate across compilation environments, and is 50% faster than state-of-the-art at classifying binaries. We will release Tinbergen as open source upon acceptance. Figure 12: e distribution of equivalence class sizes for all generated decision trees in the coreutils-8.30 evaluation.
